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DAVID GRAY CARLSON*

The Jones Act and Choice of Law
The American system for compensating its seamen for injuries is without
peer in liberality and generosity and is surpassed only by the ease with which a
foreign seaman is given access to American courts to partake in the bounty. It
is no surprise, then, that foreign seamen from all over the world are flocking
to American courts to pursue their remedies, shunning the less liberal national systems that prevail around the world. As a result, the body of case law
governing the conditions under which an American court will adjudicate the
claim of foreign seamen has burgeoned.
The abovementioned phenomenon can be attributed to the Jones Act.'
This statute, by its terms, seems to be universal in application: "Any seaman
who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his
election, maintain an action for damages at law ... "I
Naturally, these principles have not been pushed to their logical extremes.
They are limited by familiar international law and conflict of law principles
which also are an operative part of our governing legal matrix.3 These principles operate under a different theoretical context in Jones Act cases than in
general maritime cases. Whether a foreign seaman has a cause of action
under the Jones Act is a matter of statutory construction. The leading case of
Lauritzen v. Larsen,4 however, holds that international law and conflicts of
law are to be considered as part of the statutory scheme. Whether a United
States court should apply United States nonstatutory maritime law to the
claim of a foreign seaman is a classic choice of law issue. Nevertheless, the
analysis that Lauritzen v. Larsen approved for Jones Act cases is largely the
same analysis used to determine not only the choice of law but the convenient
forum under the general maritime law. 5
*Mr. Carlson practices law in New York City.
'The Jones Act, 38 Stat. 1185 § 20 (1915), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
2

1d.

"'[Ain act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains.
The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
4345 U.S. 571 (1953).
'See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 382 (1959); Complaint
of Ta Chi Navigation (Panama) Corp., 462 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Kearney v. Savannah
Foods & Indus., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 85, 87 (S.D. Ga. 1972).
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This article will consider the limitations on the applicability of the Jones
Act to the claims of American and foreign seamen in the choice of law context. As will become apparent, the scope of the Jones Act has been greatly
expanded since the Supreme Court first limited it in Lauritzen v. Larsen.
I. Application of the Jones Act to Foreign Seamen
As mentioned above, the Jones Act refers only to "[a]ny seaman," and
makes no requirement of nationality. There is no constitutional impediment
preventing Congress from passing a statute intended to cover everyone everywhere. 6 But it was held in the leading case of Lauritzen v. Larsen that Congress could not have intended such a universal application:
Congress could not have been unaware of the necessity of construction imposed
upon courts by such generality of language and was well warned that in the absence
of more definite directions than are contained in the Jones Act it would be applied
by the courts to foreign events, foreign ships, and foreign seamen only in accordance with the usual doctrines and practices of maritime law.'
Thus, Lauritzen and other cases considering whether the Jones Act ought to
be applied to foreign seamen are not, strictly speaking, jurisdiction cases but
are merely statutory construction cases. In Lauritzen, Justice Jackson noted
that the defendant appeared generally. In personam jurisdiction was complete, so that "[a] cause of action under our law was asserted here."' Nevertheless, courts remained confused,' and counsel may find in this distinction
room for procedural maneuvering. '

'See United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818); compare DeMateos v. Texaco,
Inc., 562 F.2d 895, 900 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978): "Obviously, however,
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment places bounds upon congressional efforts to
apply American rules of decision to transactions in which the United States has no sufficient
interest."
'345 U.S. 571, 581 (1953).
'Id. at 574-75. See McArthur v. Southern Airways, Inc., 569 F.2d 276, 279 (9th Cir. 1978)
(dissent).
'See, e.g., Dassigienis v. Cosmos Carriers & Trading Corp., 442 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1971);
Mihalinos v. Liberian S.S. Trikula, 342 F. Supp. 1237, 1240 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
"Counsel should remember that there is no resjudicata effect if a court, ignoring this distinction, dismisses a Jones Act claim of a foreign plaintiff on the basis of no subject matter jurisdiction. See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 543 n.54 (1969). If counsel
finds the action dismissed in this fashion, he will be informed that his array of American contacts
is not enough to satisfy the particular judge who dismissed the suit and may still file an identical
action with another federal judge who, it is hoped, will be more sympathetic to his cause.
Likewise, counsel might be able to buy some time if the defense files a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A
judge would be compelled to deny the motion on the authority of Lauritzen v. Larsen and the
plaintiff would still be in court until defense counsel could file the proper motion. Merren v. A/S
Borgestad, 518 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1975). But see Koupetoris v. Konkar Intrepid Corp., 402 F.
Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 535 F.2d 1392 (2d Cir. 1976).
It is difficult to determine which motion defense counsel should make. A motion to dismiss for
failure to state a cause of action under Rule 12(b)(6) is improper. Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 575,
makes it clear that a seaman need not allege sufficient American contacts to state a cause of
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Lauritzen v. Larsen was the first case brought by a foreign seaman under
the Jones Act to reach the Supreme Court, and today, more than twenty-five
years later, it remains the chief beacon by which United States courts are
guided. ' The actual holding of Lauritzen is fairly narrow: a foreign seaman,
working for a foreign shipowner under articles signed in New York, who is
injured in a foreign port, cannot recover under the Jones Act. But in wide-

ranging dicta, Justice Jackson, speaking for the court, attempted to sort out
the difficult issues by setting forth a general methodology for deciding when
the Jones Act could be made to apply to the claims of foreign seamen. The

chief task in choosing which nation's law should govern a transaction involving foreign seamen, said Justice Jackson, would be to ascertain and give
weight to "points of contact between the transaction and the states or governments whose competing laws are involved." ' 2 For this task, Justice Jackson
called upon the teaching of international law principles.' 3
Justice Jackson found seven factors generally conceded to be influential in

determining which law should govern a tort claim.'4 These seven factors have

been cited over and over again,' 5 and before each is explored, it is helpful to
discuss the nature of these points of contact. For instance, the Lauritzen
factors are not the only factors which courts are permitted to consider.' 6

action. See also Romero v. International Terminal Co., 358 U.S. 354, 359 (1958). A claim that
the Jones Act does not apply because of a lack of American contacts probably is an affirmative
defense under Rule 8(c) and, therefore, not subject to a Rule 12 motion. See also Alaska Packers
Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547-48 (1935). If Alaska Packers is correct,
summary judgment is the proper way for a defendant to challenge a foreign seaman's standing to
sue under the Jones Act. See, e.g., Merren v. A/S Borgestad, supra. Because summary judgment
involves examination of the merits beyond the pleadings, a foreign seaman is entitled to the full
panoply of discovery devices by which he can search for the existence of contacts sufficient to
establish a case under the Jones Act. See Lekkas v. Liberian M/V Caledonian, 443 F.2d 10 (4th
Cir. 1971); Grammenos v. Lemos, 457 F.2d 1067 (2d Cir. 1972).
"See, e.g., Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carriers Corp., 368 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 1007 (1967); Rode v. Sedco, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Tex. 1975).
12345 U.S. at 582.
"Perhaps in deference to the intensely nationalistic views of the era, Justice Jackson was
careful to point out that these principles had "the force of law not from extraterritorial reach of
national laws, nor from abdication of its sovereign powers by any nation, but from acceptance
by common consent of civilized communities of rules designed to foster amicable and workable
commercial relations." 345 U.S. at 581-82. Nevertheless, principles of international law were
held to be of the utmost importance:
But in dealing with international commerce we cannot be unmindful of the necessity for
mutual forbearance if retaliations are to be avoided; nor should we forget that any contact
which we hold sufficient to warrant application of our law to a foreign transaction will logically be as strong for a foreign country to apply its law to an American transaction.
Id. at 582.
"The seven Lauritzen factors, which will be considered in detail later, are (1) the place of the
wrongful act; (2) the law of the flag; (3) allegiance of the defendant shipowner; (4) the place
where the contract of employment was made; (5) the inaccessibility of a foreign forum; (6) the
allegiance or domicile of the injured seaman; and (7) the law of the forum.
"Judge Goldberg has dubbed them "the seven immortal pillars." Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v.
Rhoditis, 412 F.2d 919, 922 (5th Cir. 1969), aff'd, 398 U.S. 300 (1970).
'See Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 309 (1970) (base of defendant's operations was in New York). Of course, courts should not seize on just any contact to justify the
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Other legitimate points of contact with the United States may be relied upon
by courts to uphold the application of the Jones Act to foreign seamen." Nor
are the various factors to be mechanically applied. A court should not merely
count up the factors on each side, but it should weigh each factor individually
against the others. Thus, one or two particularly important local contacts
may outweigh a numerical majority of foreign contacts.'" In fact, one prestigious Second Circuit opinion, Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 9
held that "substantial contacts" were all that were needed, and that as soon
as a substantial contact was found, a court should stop its deliberations and
proceed to apply the Jones Act to the case before it. Judge Medina, who
wrote the Bartholomew case, makes a persuasive argument for his "substantial contacts" theory, and given the possible vitality of the holding, it is worth
exploring.
Judge Medina was fairly critical of the balancing approach of Lauritzen v.
Larsen. He suggested that the standards set forth in that case were inherently
vague and lacked a common principle of decision or method of approach.
Results, he claimed, were being reached by "mere dialectic, manipulation, or
guesswork."" 0 Rather than balancing the various points of contact, Judge
Medina undertook to restate the procedure for deciding whether the Jones
Act should apply to a foreign seaman in light of the various results which had
been reached in the Jones Act cases. First, he noted that the cases made it
clear that "not every contact, no matter how ephemeral or fortuitous it might
be, would be deemed a basis for applying. . the Jones Act." 2 1Second, he
noted that no single point of contact had ever been made indispensable.2 2
Third, the cases could not support a conclusion that the Jones Act should be
applied only where the United States could claim the most vital connections
with the transaction. 3 From these truths Judge Medina came to the following
conclusions:
Hence it must be said that in a particular case something between minimal and
preponderant contacts is necessary if the Jones Act is to be applied. Thus we conclude that the test is that "substantial" contacts are necessary. And while ...

one

application of the Jones Act. The reports are full of cases where minimal American contacts were
held insufficient to warrant the application of American law. See teonard v. General Carriers,
S.A., 1975 C.M.A. 471 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (call on ports in United States); Frangiskatos v. Konkar
Maritime Enterprises, 471 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972) (branch office to handle charter agreements,

insurance matters); Dassigienis v. Cosmos Carriers & Trading Corp., 442 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir.
1971) (checking account in New York); Camarias v. M/V Lady Era, 318 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Va.
1969), aff'd, 432 F.2d 1234 (4th Cir. 1970) (plaintiff married to American citizen).
"See Koupetoris v. Konkar Intrepid Corp., 535 F.2d 1392, 1396 n.21 (2d Cir. 1976).
'Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 308-310 (1970).
"263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1000 (1959).

20263 F.2d at 439.
"Id. at 440.
22/d.

"Id. Judge Medina noted that American seamen working for foreign vessels had been able to

sue for their injuries under the Jones Act. It was beyond doubt, however, that a foreign seaman

working on a vessel flying the American flag could sue his employer under the Jones Act.
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contact such as the fact that the vessel flies the American flag may alone be sufficient, this is no more than to say that in such case the contact is so2 obviously
substantial as to render unnecessary a further probing into the facts. 1
Judge Medina found such a formulation attractive for two reasons. First,
it was a rational method for determining the difficult question of congressional intent. Second, the proposed test posed no metaphysical difficulty of
weighing factors that were present against factors that were absent; for example, the fact that the injury did take place in American waters against the fact
that the vessel did not fly an American flag. Instead, a judge using the
Bartholomew test need only consider each fact or group of facts constituting
an American contact with the transaction to determine whether that contact
is substantial. If no single contact is substantial, the judge must then decide
whether the aggregate of insubstantial contacts adds up to the necessary substantiality. No balancing at all occurs in the Bartholomew test.
Is there actually a difference between the Lauritzen and Bartholomew
tests?25 Although the results produced by these tests usually will be the same,
the tests are conceptually different, and in the rare case where two nations
have genuinely conflicting substantial interests in a mishap on the high seas,
the Bartholomew test is more likely to uphold application of the Jones Act
than is the Lauritzen test.26 In such a case, a court relying on Lauritzen might
be tempted to defer to the law of a foreign nation if such nation is found to
have an interest even more substantial than the concededly substantial interest of the United States. A court relying on Bartholomew would simply
stop its inquiry upon finding a substantial American interest.
The two cases represent two schools of thought on the subject of conflicts
of law. Lauritzen seems to have been written with the notion in mind that
only one nation should be able to apply its laws to a transaction, while
Bartholomew seems to represent a more modern "interest analysis" approach.2

2"4d.
"For a case articulating the difference between Lauritzen and Bartholomew, see Shahid v.
A/S Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi, 236 F. Supp. 751, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
" Compare Garis v. Cia. San Basilio, 267 F. Supp. 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 386 F.2d 155
(2d Cir. 1967), with Antypas v. Cia. San Basilio, 541 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1098 (1977).
"Interest analysis as a method of resolving conflict-of-law questions involves a five-step
process, according to its founder, Brainerd Currie:
1.Normally, even in cases involving foreign factors, a court should as a matter of course
look to the law of the forum as the source of the rule of decision.
2. When it is suggested that the law of a foreign state, rather than the law of the forum,
should furnish the rule of decision, the court should first of all determine the governmental
policy-perhaps it is helpful to say the social, economic, or administrative policy-which is
expressed by the law of the forum. The court should then inquire whether the relationship of
the forum state to the case at bar-that is, to the parties, to the transaction, to the subject
matter, to the litigation-is such as to bring the case within the scope of the state's governmental concern, and to provide a legitimate basis for the assertion that the state has an interest in
the application of that policy to the case at bar.
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Whether Bartholomew is good law is a live question. The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit said in 1964 that Bartholomew had been more or less
overruled by McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional.28 In McCulloch, the Supreme
Court considered whether the National Labor Relations Act should be applied to vessels with foreign crews owned by foreign subsidiaries of American
corporations, and ruled that the law of the country whose flag the ship flew
(the law of the Flag) should govern matters of shipboard discipline. The
Second Circuit took this to mean that it should weigh American contacts
against the fact of foreign registration. 29
The Second Circuit reaffirmed its view two years later in Tsakonitis v.
Transpacific Carriers Corp. In that case, the plaintiff was a foreign seaman
injured in the United States on a vessel flying the flag of Greece. The vessel
was owned by a Panamanian corporation, which in turn was owned by a
Greek corporation, Hellenic Lines, Ltd. Hellenic Lines was largely owned by
a Greek national, Pericles Callimanopoulos. The headquarters of Hellenic
Lines, however, were in New York, and Callimanopoulos, who was also
general manager of Hellenic Lines, resided in Connecticut. The plaintiff sued
under the Jones Act, but the trial court dismissed the claim and the Second
Circuit affirmed. The language of the court was strictly balancing language:
"Wherever, as here, there are various factors to be weighed for and against
jurisdiction, the decision must be controlled by the more weighty . . ."'The
court continued: "Greece certainly has enough contacts with the ship so that
our courts should hesitate out of considerations of comity before applying
and foisting upon it the heavy potential liabilities of the American law of
American personal injuries.'' 2
The latest case from the United States Supreme Court on the subject of
foreign seamen in American courts, Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis," involved precisely the same fact situation as Tsakonitis, except that the plaintiff
was injured in Louisiana. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, came to a
conclusion opposite that of the Second Circuit and quoted Bartholomew with
approval. It is difficult, however, to determine whether Justice Douglas actually employed the Lauritzen or the Bartholomew test in reaching his conclusion.

4. If the court finds that the forum state has no interest in the application of its law and
policy, but that the foreign state has such an interest, it should apply the foreign law.
5. If the court should find that the foreign state has an interest in the application of its law
and policy, it should apply the law of the forum state even though the foreign state also has
such an interest, and, a fortiori, it should apply the law of the forum if the foreign state has no
such interest.
Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Government Interests and the Judicial
Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 9-10 (1958) (accompanying footnotes omitted).
"372 U.S. 10 (1963).
"Tionaman v. A/S Glittre, 340 F.2d 290, 292 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 925 (1965).
"368 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.1007 (1967).
"Id. at 429.
"Id. at 428.
"398 U.S. 306 (1969).
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On the one hand, Justice Douglas argued that the foreign shipowner enjoyed the protection of American laws and therefore ought to be subject to
liability thereunder. 3" This language is reminiscent of the reasoning in
Bartholomew, which looks only for a substantial reason to apply American
law. On the other hand, Justice Douglas counted up the various foreign
contacts and found them numerically superior but "minor weights in the
scales compared with the substantialand continuing contacts that this alien
owner has with this country."" This is clearly balancing language in the
Lauritzen mold, but it is unclear whether Justice Douglas meant that the
preponderance of the interests militated for the choice of American law, or
merely that substantial contacts with the United States demand the application of the Jones Act absent any good reason why it should not be applied. It
must be conceded that the Greek contacts certainly would have upheld Greek
jurisdiction under the Lauritzen principles. 6 Justice Harlan's dissent in Hellenic Lines v. Rhoditis strongly criticized the majority opinion for upholding
the application of the Jones Act in light of the overwhelming Greek interest in
adjudicating the matter. Therefore, in spite of language suggesting a balancing approach, the case can be viewed on its facts as a classic example of
interest analysis in that it applied American law even though a foreign jurisdiction had substantial contacts with the transaction.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Moncada v. Lemuria
Shipping Corp., stated flatly that Rhoditis expressly adopted the Bartholomew test:
No subsequent decision of this court or of the Supreme Court has undercut the
holding of Bartholomew. Indeed, in [Rhoditis], the Supreme Court expressly
adopted the test enunciated by Judge Medina in Bartholomew. Whether, as appellee suggests, the dissent in Rhoditis might now win the support of a majority of the
Supreme Court is not for us to decide.37
I.

Points of Contact Justifying Application of
the Jones Act

Having discussed as clearly as possible the nature of the various points of
contact which have been used to decide Jones Act cases, it is now necessary to
consider these contacts and how they are viewed by the courts.

"Id. at 309-310.
"Id. at 310 (emphasis added).
"See Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., supra note 19 at 440. Also, see note 68 infra.
"491 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Ekberg Shipping Corp. v. Moncada, 417
U.S. 947 (1974). Accord, Complaint of Ta Chi Navigation (Panama) Corp., 462 F. Supp. 260,
262(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Rodev. Sedco, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 206, 210(E.D. Tex. 1975). In DeMateos
v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978), the adoption of
Bartholomew by Rhoditis was rejected as contrary to due process standards. See text at notes
116-21 infra.
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Lauritzen v. Larsen listed seven such points of contact:
the
the
the
the
the
the
the

place of the wrongful act;
place where the contract of employment was made;
inaccessibility of a foreign forum;
law of the forum;
law of the flag;
allegiance of domicile of the injured seaman;
allegiance of the defendant shipowner. 8

To these, Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis added:
(8)

The place of the shipowner's base of operations.39

Of these eight factors, the first four have been dismissed as unimportant in
influencing litigation. Although there is occasional language suggesting that
the presence of one of these factors might make the extra difference in a close
case, it is hard to justify why this should be so. The chief fault shared by these
four lesser contacts is that they are fortuitous and do not properly reflect the
interests nations have in any given maritime transaction. For instance, given
the highi" mobile nature of the maritime business, the fact that a seaman
signed h, articles in any given port is a matter of mere chance. As Justice
Jackson said in Lauritzen:
A seaman takes his employment, like his fun, where he finds it; a ship takes on crew
in any port where it needs them. The practical effect of making the lexlocicontractus govern all tort claims during the service would be to subject a ship to a multitude
of systems of law, to put some of the crew in a more advantageous position than

others, and not unlikely in the long run to diminish hirings in ports of countries that
best take care of their seamen."

The forum in which a seaman brings his action also is likely to be the result of
a fortuitous, if not self-servingly calculated, choice." The place of the wrongful act also is a matter of chance in the maritime business. Too many jurisdictions are traversed by a vessel in any given voyage to make the place of the
wrong an effective way to choose the proper law to apply to a given tort. 2

11345 U.S. at 583.
"... and there may be others." Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970). See,
e.g., Pavlou v. Ocean Traders Marine Corp., 211 F. Supp. 320, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (plaintiff
signed a contract naming the law of Greece as applicable).
10345 U.S. at 571. The Court also notes that while the place of contract might be important for

a choice of law problem involving a contract dispute, it is of little use in deciding a tort question.
See also Romero v. International Terminal Co., 358 U.S. 354, 383 (1959). Seamen often sign
articles which stipulate that the law of a particular nation shall apply to any personal injuries, but
these clauses are ignored where there is reason to apply the Jones Act. Pandazopoulos v. Universal Cruise Lines, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 208, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); comparePavlou v. Ocean Traders
Marine Corp., 211 F. Supp. 320, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (stipulated choice of law given some
weight in the Lauritzen balancing test); Voyiatzis v. National Shipping & Trading Corp., 199 F.
Supp. 920, 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
"1345 U.S. at 588. As to when a seaman, in his articles, stipulates which law should apply to his
personal injuries, see cases cited in note 40 supra.
41d. at 583-84; Romero v. International Terminal Co., 358 U.S. 354, 384 (1959); Conte v.

Flota Mercante del Estado, 277 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1960); Berendson v. Rederiaktiebolaget Volo,
257 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 895 (1958); The Fletero v. Arias, 206 F. Supp. 835
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The argument has been made, however, that this factor ought to be important when the injury causes the seaman to be cast onto the public resources of
a community in the United States. 3 It also should be true that where the
business of the vessel is completely within a single jurisdiction, the place of
the injury thereby becomes a matter worthy of consideration." As for inaccessibility of a foreign forum, the United States Supreme Court has made it
clear that while such a factor is influential when an admiralty court decides
whether it should keep jurisdiction over claims between foreigners, it is irrelevant in deciding whether United States law should be applied to that claim."
Simple inaccessibility of a foreign forum is, properly speaking, no point of
contact with United States interests at all.
The remaining points of contact have been more influential in determining
the issue of Jones Act applicability and, therefore, they deserve to be treated
in more detail.
III. Allegiance of the Seaman
The allegiance of the plaintiff seaman was purported to be an important
factor in deciding whether to apply the Jones Act in Lauritzen v. Larsen. 6
The ancient rule, it was said, automatically attributed the nationality of the
vessel to the crew. But while "during service under a foreign flag some duty

of allegiance is due," the Court acknowledged that "each nation has a legitimate interest that its nationals and permanent inhabitants be not maimed
or disabled from self-support." 7 Thus, in Uravic v. F. Jarka Co.,4 8 the
plaintiff's American citizenship was considered a major persuasive factor in
supporting the applicability of the Jones Act. The facts in that case were
unique to the times, however, and not particularly good authority for the

proposition that the seaman's nationality is an important factor in a choice of
law context.4 9 Much better authority for the proposition that American citi-

zenship is an important factor in favor of applying the Jones Act is Gambera

(E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd, 288 F.2d 437 (3rd Cir. 1961). But compare Gambera v. Bergoty, 132 F.2d
414 (2d Cir. 1942), with O'Neill v. Cunard White Star, 160 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1947). See also
Kyriakos v. Goulandris, 151 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1945) (plaintiff recovered under the Jones Act
upon showing of place of tort and place of contract). Cases prior to Lauritzen probably should
be considered questionable authority on this score.
"3Currie, The Silver Oar andAll That: A Study of the Romero Case, 27 U. Cm. L. REV. 1,6575 (1959). See also Watson v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1954).
But see Pertichino v. Meridional Pesca Degiosa, 444 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
"Alvarez v. Creole Petroleum Corp., 462 F. Supp. 782, 787 (D. Del. 1978).
"345 U.S. at 589-90.
"Id. at 586.
"ld.
282 U.S. 237 (1931).
"In Uravic, id., plaintiff's decedent was a longshoreman working for an American stevedoring company. During work on a German ship, plaintiff's decedent was killed. Plaintiff was
able to sue under the Jones Act because the accident occurred before the passage of the
4
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v. Bergoty.5° That case involved a foreign seaman, but the seaman was a longterm American resident. Injured in the United States on a vessel flying a
foreign flag, the seaman was allowed to recover under the Jones Act. While
alien seamen on alien ships generally could not expect Jones Act protection,
the court said:
The case at bar was not of that sort. Not only had the libellant been domiciled in the
United States for over 20 years ... but the voyage began and ended in the United
States ....The whole voyage was thus to be performed within our territorial waters ....That presents a wholly different situation from any that have hitherto
arisen. "
Courts are prepared to go the other way when no contact other than American citizenship or residence of the plaintiff is present. In O'Neill v. Cunard
White Star52 and Smith v.Furness Withy & Co.,53 relief was denied where the
only American contact was the residence of the plaintiff. Thus, if Gambera,a
pre-Lauritzencase, can still be considered good authority, two principles can
be drawn from it. First, American residence of a foreign seaman is just as
potent a local contact as is American citizenship. And second, an American
resident or citizen cannot expect to recover from his foreign employer unless
another local contact is present. The American resident suing the foreign
employer, then, may be one of the few situations where such insignificant
contact points as "place-of-the-injury" are influential. This conclusion certainly is bolstered by the presence of language in Uravic emphasizing that the
plaintiff was injured in an American port."
If American citizenship or residence is a point of contact favoring application of the Jones Act, foreign citizenship or residence ought to weigh against
its application." Under the Bartholomew formulation, of course, this and
any other point of contact favoring foreign law are irrelevant in the face of

Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act in 1927 and after the Supreme
Court's opinion in InternationalStevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926). Defendant
claimed that because, under Haverty, plaintiff's decedent was a seaman pro hac vice, and because, under the ancient rule, the nationality of the flag was attributed to the seamen aboard the
vessel, plaintiff's decedent should be considered a German national. On these narrow facts, the
Court ruled:
There is strong reason for giving the same protection to the person of those who work in our
harbors when they are working upon a German ship that they would receive when working
upon an American ship in the next dock, as is especially obvious in the case of stevedores who
may be employed in unloading the vessels of half a dozen different flags in turn.
282 U.S. at 238-39. Compare Lemonis v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 81 Misc. 2d 614, 366
N.Y.S.2d 541 (1975).
"132 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1942).
"Id. at 415-16.
"160 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1947).
S119 F. Supp. 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
"See note 49 supra.
"in Pandazopoulos v. Universal Cruise Lines, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 208, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
allegiance of plaintiff to Greece was said to weigh against application of the Jones Act but was
not determinative of the issue. The fact that the choice was between Panamanian and United
States law reduced its significance.

Jones Act and Choice of Law

59

established United States interests embodied in other contact points. Thus, in
Rhoditis, the plaintiff's foreign citizenship was dismissed as a "minor weight
in the scales" in comparison with the defendant's United States contacts. '
The dissent in Rhoditis by Justice Harlan takes a unique position on the
importance of the plaintiff's foreign citizenship in determining whether to
apply the Jones Act; it would end the access to United States courts that
foreign seamen now enjoy. The membership of the Supreme Court has
changed drastically since the Rhoditis opinion was handed down in 1970
however. Therefore, the view of Justice Harlan ought to be examined, be7
cause it may be that some future majority of the Court may yet adopt it.1
Justice Harlan begins his dissent by citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, a case dealing with the National Labor Relations Act as applied to
foreign crews of foreign vessels, 8 and Lauritzen for the proposition that the
nationality of the ship's flag was such an important contact point with a
foreign nation that it must "overbear most other connecting events in determining applicable law . . . unless some heavy counterweight appears." 9
"Such a counterweight would exist," argued Justice Harlan, "only in circumstances where the application of the American rule of law would further
the purpose of Congress."" Of necessity, some legislation had to reach beyond the United States' borders, but this was not necessarily the case with
regard to an act providing personal injury remedies. Justice Harlan continued:
The only justification that I can see for extending extraterritorially a remedial-type
provision like [the Jones Act] is that the injured seaman is an individual whose wellbeing is a concern of this country. It was for this reason that Lauritzen recognized
the residence of the plaintiff as a factor that should properly be considered in
deciding who is a "seaman" as Congress employed that term in [the Jones Act]."
He then proposed the following rule:
When, as in the case before us, the injured plaintiff has no American ties, the
inquiry should be directed toward determining what jurisdiction is primarily concerned with plaintiff's welfare and whether that jurisdiction's rule may, consistent
with those notions of due process that [require minimum contacts with that jurisdiction], govern recovery."

56398 U.S. at 310.
"See Moncada v. Lemuria Shipping Corp., 491 F.2d 470, 472 (2d Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom.
Ekberg Shipping Corp. v. Moncada, 417 U.S. 947 (1974).
'372 U.S. 10 (1963). In McCulloch, which upheld foreign law over United States law to
govern labor disputes among the ship's crew, Justice Clark was careful to point out that the
holding of the case might not apply to Jones Act cases, because personal injury controversies
might not involve internal disciplinary matters. In that regard, compare Pandazopoulos v. Universal Cruise Lines, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), with Bassis v. Universal Lines,
S.A., 322 F. Supp. 449 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 436 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1970).
"345 U.S. at 586 (1953).

"1398 U.S. at 313 (dissent).
"Id. at 313-14.
"1d. at 318.
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Thus, Justice Harlan presumably would limit application of the Jones Act
only to those seamen whose welfare is the concern of the United States, and
even then only to those cases in which application of American law is justified
by a showing of "minimum contacts" with the transaction. The problem
with looking only at the nationality of the plaintiff seaman is that Justice
Harlan ignores the foreign seaman on an American vessel. His thesis would
seem to govern these cases as well, and by doing so, the thesis contradicts the
very rule, law of the flag, which he earlier asserted was supreme. It is beyond
question that courts must apply American law to the claims of foreign
seamen injured on vessels flying the American flag. 63 It is probably more fair
to read Justice Harlan's view as limited by the facts of Rhoditis: a foreign
seaman serving on a genuinely foreign vessel. As to flags of convenience,
surely Justice Harlan would have conceded that an American vessel owner
should not escape the burdens of United States law by the simple and common device of foreign registration. Language in Justice Harlan's dissenting
opinion indicates that he would have approved the application of United
States law to United States citizens and corporations, even when a foreign
seaman is the plaintiff in a Jones Act action."
IV. The Law of the Flag, Allegiance of the
Defendant Shipowner, and Defendant's
Base of Operations
The last three points of contact, the most important of the eight examined
herein, will be considered together, as they present three ways of ascertaining
the same thing: is the Jones Act defendant sufficiently American to justify
application of United States law to its affairs? It is a principle universally
agreed upon that a nation ought to be able to govern the conduct of its

63

Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437,440(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
1000 (1959).
" Justice Harlan complained that the majority in Rhoditis was taking the principle of piercing
the convenient registration of a vessel too far and that, in fact, the offending vessel involved in
the case was very much a Greek vessel, not an American one. Harlan noted that the "anticonvenient flag" language of Lauritzen was preceded by citations to two cases in which American law was applied to govern the conduct of Americans abroad: "In both cases the application
of domestic law presupposed or construed legislative purpose to be furthered by reaching across
the border." 398 U.S. at 315-16. Thus, unless Justice Harlan would say that Congress had no
intention of holding United States vessels to the Jones Act, he would have to say at least that the
Jones Act must apply to the personal injury claims when foreign seamen are working aboard
American vessels. Otherwise, corporations engaging in foreign registration would gain a competitive advantage over corporations flying a United States flag. See International Stevedoring
Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50, 52 (1926): "[T]he policy of the [Jones Act] is directed to ...
treating compensation for injuries to [seamen] as properly part of the cost of doing business."
This is a principle of which Justice Harlan ought to approve, even though he put no stock in the
claim that Hellenic Lines, a genuinely foreign corporation, should not get a competitive advantage over United States shipowners.
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nationals and that if the United States wishes to impose upon an American
vessel the duty to compensate foreign nationals for their injuries, it can do so
6
consistently with international comity. 1

The easiest way to identify a ship as American is by its flag. The United
States has very strict rules emphasizing American ownership and control, as
to which vessels can register under the United States' laws.66 Application of
the Jones Act to any seaman aboard a vessel flying an American flag is
beyond doubt.67 Some courts have said that a defendant owning a vessel
registered in this country is estopped from claiming that United States law
6
should not apply to its affairs.

1

Although United States registration ends all dispute as to the application of
the Jones Act, foreign registration does not necessarily have the concomitant
opposite effect. Some older cases have allowed American seamen or foreign
69
seamen residing in the United States to recover against foreign shipowners,
but these cases, predating Lauritzen, cannot be cited with a great deal of
confidence. Nevertheless, no case stands to the contrary. Also, United States
courts are more likely to ignore "flags of convenience" and even genuine
flags if it is fair to say the vessel is owned or controlled by Americans, or is
operated from headquarters in the United States.
Lower courts have been encouraged in this practice by language in Lauritzen v. Larsen, where Justice Jackson said:
But it is common knowledge that in recent years a practice has grown, particularly
among American shipowners to avoid stringent shipping laws by seeking foreign
registration eagerly offered by some countries. Confronted with such operations,
our courts on occasion have pressed beyond the formalities of more or less nominal
foreign registration to enforce against American shipowners, the obligations which
our law places on them."0
This willingness to look beyond the substance of the vessel's registration to
determine its "true nationality" has been extended to a willingness to look
beyond foreign incorporation of a company created by American owners to
make it seem as if the vessel is owned by foreigners. Thus, in Bartholomew,
the defendant vessel flew the flag of Liberia and was owned by a Liberian
corporation. All of the stock of the Liberian corporation was held by a Pana-

6See, e.g., Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941), quoted with approval in Lauritzen v.
Larsen, 345 U.S. at 587.

6"See Certificate of Registries Act, I Stat. 288, 46 U.S.C. § 11 (1970).

""'Yet could there be any doubt that if the ship flew the American flag, without more, the
Jones Act would apply?" Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., supra, 263 F.2d at 44.
"Perdikourisv. S.S. Olympos, 196 F. Supp. 849, 854 (E.D. Va. 1961). Seealso Rainbow Line,
Inc. v. M/V Tequila, 480 F.2d 1024, 1027 (2nd Cir. 1973).
"Gambera v. Bergoty, note 50 supra.
"0345 U.S. at 587 (footnotes omitted). One court has gone so far as to list the flag as one of the
unimportant but not quite meaningless factors in the choice of law context. See Koupetouris v.
Konkar Intrepid Corp., 402 F. Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 535 F.2d 1392 (2d Cir. 1976).
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manian corporation, and, in turn, all of the stock of the Panamanian corporation was owned by American citizens. In addition, all the officers of the
Liberian corporation were Americans, and its principal place of business was
New York City. Its Liberian office was maintained there as a mere statutory
formality. On the basis of this evidence, the defendant Liberian corporation
was proclaimed "American" for the purposes of the Jones Act:
[L]ooking through the facade of foreign registration and incorporation to the
American ownership behind it is now well established ... This is essential unless

the purposes of the Jones Act are to be frustrated by American shipowners intent
upon evading their obligations under the law by the simple expedient of incorporating in a foreign country and registering their vessels under a foreign flag .... In the

case now before us appellant has taken the trouble to insert an additional nominal
foreign corporation between the flag and the true beneficial ownership of the vessel.
But we have little difficulty in brushing all this aside when considering the applicability vel non of the Jones Act. Complicating the mechanics of evasive schemes
cannot serve to make them more effective. 7'
Judge Medina went on to explain that the process of looking through foreign
incorporation was to be distinguished from piercing the corporate veil. Such
veil piercing is an equitable doctrine whereby a court ignores the corporate
entity and holds the shareholders directly liable for the debts of the corporation. Here, the corporate entity is not ignored. Rather, its nationality is determined to be American by examining its true nature. Thus, in Bartholomew, it
was the defendant Liberian corporation which was finally liable, rather than
the American shareholders.
What factors, then, will lead a court to proclaim as "American" a foreign
vessel or a foreign corporation owning a foreign vessel? Principally, the relevant issues are ownership and control.72 Foreign vessels completely owned by
Americans are easy cases. Courts will infer control of the vessel from its
complete ownership.73 But several cases also have asserted that even complete
American ownership is not enough by itself.7" Thus, if Americans were the
"1263 F.2d at 442.
'Cases exist asserting that unsupported allegations by plaintiff's counsel of American ownership and control will not justify the application of the Jones Act. Sfiridas v. Santa Cecelia Co.,
358 F. Supp. 108, 112 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Scognamiglio v. Home Lines, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 605
(S.D.N.Y. 1965). Such statements might give rise to the notion that it is the plaintiff's responsibility to establish American contacts such that the Jones Act might be made to apply. See, e.g.,
Xerakis v. Greek Line, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 774, 775 (E.D. Pa. 1974). On the theory that the
burden of proof should normally folloiv the burden of pleading, it should be reiterated that a
plaintiff states a cause of action without alleging sufficient American contacts. "A cause of
action under our law was asserted here." Lauritzen v. Larsen, supra, 345 U.S. at 575. See note 10
and accompanying text supra.
"Pandazopoulos v. Universal Lines, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Seealso Groves
v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Voyiatzis v. National Shipping
& Trading Corp., 193 F. Supp. 920 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (control by defendant not mentioned);
Rodriguez v. Solar Shipping, Ltd., 169 F. Supp. 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Bobolakis v. Compania
Panamena Maritima San Gerissimo, 168 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). Contra, Mpampouros
v. Steamship Auromar, 203 F. Supp. 944 (D. Md. 1962). The Mpampouros case stands alone in
holding that American ownership and control, without more, is not a sufficient contact with the
United States.
"DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978),
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beneficial owners of a vessel, but foreign interests were in control as trustees,
the Jones Act, according to these cases, could not apply.
Judge Medina, in Bartholomew termed "in doubt" the cases which hold
that ownership alone is not enough," and if the case retains its vitality, a mere
showing of American ownership may suffice. As one judge aptly pointed out,
American business affairs generally are organized around democratic principles, and if an American owns a majority of shares in a corporation, it should
be presumed, in the absence of a contrary showing, that he is in control of the
vessel and that it should be considered American. 7" Also, minority American
ownership will be considered sufficient local contact to warrant the application of the Jones Act if that minority percentage of ownership is coupled with
control of the corporation which owns the vessel." Thus, evidence of such
control might include a showing that Americans dominate the board of directors or the staff of officers," the inference being that American interests put
them there. The mere fact that an American has been hired to manage a
foreign corporation, however, is not itself enough to establish American control."
The Rhoditis decision added the notion that a vessel was American if its
base of operations was in the United States. It will be recalled that the Gamberadecision established that whether the plaintiff seaman was an American
citizen or a foreign citizen with American residence, his contact with the
United States was equally potent. 8" Rhoditis applied this principle to the
defendant so that whether the corporation is American by "citizenship" or
its corporate equivalent, or merely by the corporate equivalent of "residence," the Jones Act will be made to apply. The "base of operations"
theory thus is very close to the "American control" theory. If the vessel is

discussed in text accompanying notes 116-21 infra.; Moutzouris v. National Shipping & Trading
Co., 194 F. Supp. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (control alone would be enough, but ownership alone is
insufficient, in spite of Bartholomew dicta); Mproumeriotis v. Seacrest Shipping Co., 149 F.
Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Argyros v. Polar Compania de Navigacion, 146 F. Supp. 624
(S.D.N.Y. 1956). One case that is cited as holding that ownership alone sufficient is Bobolakis v.
Compania Panamena Maritima San Gerissimo, 168 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). See also
Moncada v. Lemuria Shipping Co., 491 F.2d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom.
Ekberg v. Moncada, 417 U.S. 947 (1974). It should be noted that in Bobolakis, control was
alleged and inferred, so that statements on the sufficiency of ownership are dicta at best.
'263 F.2d at 443 n.4. Accord, Moncada v. Lemuria Shipping Co., 491 F.2d 470, 473 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied sub nom. Ekberg v. Moncada, 417 U.S. 947 (1974). Contra, DeMateos v.
Texaco, Inc., supra, 562 F.2d at 895.
"Mpampouros v. Steamship Auromar, 203 F. Supp. 944, 948 n.3 (D. Md. 1962).
"Southern Cross Steamship Co. v. Firipis, 285 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
869 (1961); Complaint of Ta Chi Navigation (Panama) Corp., 462 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Pavlou v. Ocean Traders Marine Corp., 211 F. Supp. 320, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
"Moncada v. Lemuria Shipping Corp., supra, 491 F.2d at 474; Bartholomew v. Universe
Tankships, Inc. supra, 263 F.2d at 441. See also Rainbow Line, Inc. v. M/V Tequila, 480 F.2d
1024 (2d Cir. 1973).
"See Turner v. Jack Tar Grand Bahama, Ltd., 353 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1965).
'"See notes 50-54 and accompanying text supra.
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being directed from an American site, it will be deemed American for the
purposes of the Jones Act on the theory that a foreign corporation which, by
residing here, avails itself of the protection of American laws ought to assume
the burdens of American laws as well.81
Defining what constitutes a "base of operations" in this country is not so
easy, and on this particular point the case law is sparse. The presence of
various agents representing foreign corporations in this country generally
will not be sufficient. For instance, it is very common for foreign companies
to hire husbanding agents in this country to handle provisioning and other
matters when a vessel arrives. The presence of a husbanding agent is not by
itself enough to warrant a finding that the base of operations is here, "2 even if
the foreign corporation owns (or the shareholders of the foreign corporation
own) the American corporation which serves as the husbanding agent. "3 Nor
is a branch office here enough to constitute the "base of operations" if that
office only handles local charter agreements and insurance matters." Thus, it
is apparent that the United States office which is purported to be the "base of
operations" must be in actual control of the vessel.8 At this point, it might be
useful to take note of Gomez v. Karavias U.S.A. Inc.,86 which held the Jones
Act applicable to a foreign corporation on the ground that
[W]hen the realities of the [defendant's] shipping operation are examined, and
when the various separate corporations are looked at in relation to each other, it is
apparent that the Karavias operation is world-wide, and that an important part of
this operation is based in the United States. "7
Thus, if Gomez is to be followed, a conclusion that is far from certain," it
need be shown only that defendant's operation is world-wide and that the

"See 398 U.S. at 310.
' 2Fitzgerald v. Zim Israel Navigation Co., 1975 C.M.A. 1425 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Dassigienis v.
Cosmos Carriers & Trading Corp., 321 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 1016 (2d
Cir. 1971).
'3 Koupetouris v. Konkar Intrepid Corp., 402 F. Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 535 F.2d
1392 (2d Cir. 1976); Brillis v. Chandris (U.S.A.) Inc., 215 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
"Merren v. A/S Borgestad, 519 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1975); Frangiskatos v. Konkar Maritime
Enterprises, S.A., 471 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972); Hazell v. Booth S.S. Co., 444 F. Supp. 85
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Manlugon v. A/S Facto, 419 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Mihalinos v.
Liberian S.S. Trikala, 342 F. Supp. 1237 (S.D. Cal. 1972). See Hoidas v. Orion & Global
Chartering Co., 440 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (local agent merely transmitted messages).
"In Rhoditis, the majority cited as evidence that the base of operations was in the United
States the fact that many voyages started and ended in this country. 398 U.S. at 310. See also
Moncada v. Lemuria Shipping Co., supra, 491 F.2d at 473; Complaint of Ta Chi Navigation
(Panama) Corp. supra, 462 F. Supp. at 266. Whether or not this is persuasive evidence to show
that the vessels are actually controlled from the United States, it is clear that starting or ending a
voyage in the United States is not of itself a weighty contact with the United States. See, e.g.,
Sammas v. The SS Jacob Verolme, 187 F. Supp. 406 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
"401 F. Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
"Id. at 107.
"Compare Koupetoris v. Konkar Intrepid Corp., 535 F.2d 1392, 1396 n.21 (2d Cir. 1976).
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part of the operation-in the form of subsidiaries or agents-which is in the
United States is "important." Perhaps implicit in the court's holding was the
fact that no other nation could claim to be the multinational corporation's
headquarters, and in the absence of such a home base, United States courts
would apply the Jones Act where "there are substantial relevant contacts
with the United States." 89
While the presence of agents in the United States may generally be presumed to be insufficient contact to justify application of the Jones Act, the
presence of an agent hired to manage the vessel on behalf of the owner may
result in a finding that the base of operations is located here. In Pavlou v.
Ocean TradersMarine Corp.,9" the defendant, a Liberian corporation, delegated managerial duties to a New York corporation which turned all profits
back to the defendant. The New York corporation was partly owned by the
same persons who partly owned the defendant corporation. The defendant
corporation was forty-eight percent owned by Americans, and from this the
court drew an inference that the defendant was "controlled" by Americans.
But as an alternative ground for applying the Jones Act, the court noted the
base of operations was in New York:
[W]hen the mode and manner of doing business which have all the attributes of a
domestic business operation, the business or corporation may become subject to
the laws of this country, even though the more formal manifestations of the arrangement appear to be foreign. Of necessity, such a result follows when the situation, because of the nature of the business, involves statutory legal obligations on
the part of an employer for the injuries of his or its employees. The Jones Act
creates such a legal obligation. Congress enacted those statutory provisions governing certain business operations in this country to accomplish specific social objectives which were deemed advisable. 9'
Thus, when a foreign corporation delegates enough power that the vessel is
actually "managed" from the United States, it may find itself subject to the
Jones Act.92
V. Offshore Oil Drilling in Foreign Waters:
A Detour into Substantive Liability
The Pavloucase raises an interesting dilemma for the plaintiff who wishes
to sue for injuries under the Jones Act if the owner of a vessel has delegated
management of the vessel to an agent of a different nationality. The problem
arises from the undisputed fact that there can be only one "employer" under

"Id.
'"211 F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
'Id. at 324. Accord, Southern Cross Steamship Co. v. Firipis, 285 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1960).
"Complaint of Ta Chi Navigation (Panama) Corp., 462 F. Supp. 260, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
see also Antypas v. Cia. Maritima San Basilio, 541 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1098 (1977). In Antypas, the majority also relied on the American ownership of the foreign
corporation owning the vessel. The evidence of such ownership, however, was very shaky, so
that delegation of control to an American corporation should be considered the basis of the
result. 541 F.2d at 310. See also the dissenting opinion in Antypas, 541 F.2d at 310-11.
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the Jones Act, a principal established in Cosmopolitan Co. v. McAllister.93 A
plaintiff may find that the existence and nature of liability shifts depending
upon the circumstances of the injury.
This problem can arise in the context of American oil drilling ventures in
foreign waters, such as those now in the North Sea. A common arrangement
in such ventures is for an oil company to subcontract construction work to
other companies in order to construct either fixed or floating oil drilling rigs.
Since construction of the oil rigs is undertaken far from United States labor
markets, foreign subcontractors sometimes supply foreign laborers for work
directly on the oil rig or sometimes on adjoining foreign flag vessels owned
and operated by the subcontractors. The situation can give rise to a variety of
liability and choice of law problems.
A peculiar consideration relevant to the offshore oil industry is whether the
oil rig is a "vessel." If it is not, the Jones Act cannot apply.9" Movable oil rigs
certainly qualify as vessels." Fixed installations off the coast of the United
States, however, are treated as land under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act. 9" In Rodrique v. Aetna Cas. Co., 9 the Supreme Court seemed to indicate that no fixed installation is ever a vessel within the maritime jurisdiction.98 As to fixed installations off the shore of foreign lands, it would seem
(although it has not been decided) that land-based choice of law principles
and land-based liability provisions will govern any injury occurring thereon.
It may also be the case that barges tied to fixed oil platforms are not "vessels"
either. Even if the barge is movable from time to time, it may be considered
part of the fixed oil platform, unless constructed for the purpose of navigation apart from those movements." The cases establishing this rule involved
rafts tied to piers in domestic waters. Application of this rule to a raft or
barge tied to a fixed oil platform is questionable, since operations are conducted on the high seas. In addition, long towing operations are required to
put these barges in place; therefore, they can easily be characterized as "vessels in navigation."

"337 U.S. 783 (1949). "We have no doubt that, under the Jones Act, only one person, firm or
corporation can be sued as employer." 337 U.S. at 791. See also Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
Inc., 398 U.S. 379, 394 (1970); Mahramas v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d
165, 170 (2d Cir. 1972). Mahramas held specifically that the employer need not be a vessel owner
for the Jones Act to apply. 475 F.2d at 165.
" Under the Jones Act, a plaintiff must be a member of a "crew" on a "vessel." Senko v.
Lacrosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370, 371 (1955).
"Cook v. Belden Concrete Products, Inc., 472 F.2d 999,1001 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
868 (1973).; Offshore Oil Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959).
"The Tidelands Act, 67 Stat. 462, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq. (1953); Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas.
Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
"395 U.S. 352 (1969).
"Id. at 360, 366. See also The Poughkeepsie, 162 F. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1908), aff'dsub nom. The
Phoenix Construction Co. v. The Steamer Poughkeepsie, 212 U.S. 558 (1908) (fixed platform in
a river with piping system to supply drinking water to a nearby town was not a vessel).
"Cook v. Belden Concrete Products, Inc., 472 F.2d 999, 1002 (5th Cir), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
868 (1973). See also Powers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 477 U.S. 643 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 856 (1973).
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Assuming that "vessels" are implicated in the injury, it becomes very important to determine whether the vessel owner or its subcontractor is the
Jones Act employer of the injured plaintiff. The indicia of this relationship
may be disposed of briefly because they are no different from the indicia
present in other areas of the law. The word "employer" in the Jones Act is to
be given its common meaning,"'0 and the common law may serve as a source
of guidance in defining the term. "' The most important factor in determining
whether the vessel owner or the independent contractor is the employer is
"control" over the plaintiff seaman. Evidence of such control includes: who
issues the orders obeyed by the seaman;' 2 who employs the master of the
vessel on which the seaman works; who hired the seaman; 13 who pays him;' 0,
and who controls the route followed by the vessel."' The characterization
adopted in the contracts between the various parties, although not decisive,"' 6 is no doubt significant.
With this background, it can be seen that the liability and choice of law
rules applicable to the vessel owner and to the subcontractor become an
elaborate matrix which nevertheless poses little chance for American companies to escape liability altogether. If United States law applies to the vessel
owner which hires a truly foreign subcontractor, the vessel owner by no
means escapes liability if it is not the Jones Act employer. Even if the American vessel owner is not the employer, it may be liable to the injured seaman
under two other maritime theories. First, it will be liable if its negligence or
the negligence of its servants caused the injury."' Second, if the injury was
caused by the unseaworthiness of the vessel, the owner will be liable to the
injured seaman, because the warranty of seaworthiness runs to certain business invitees who are present aboard the vessel. ' In fact, if ancient
longshoremen's law is to be taken at face value, the warranty of seaworthiness includes a warranty that the employer of the injured seaman will not

"'"Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783, 791 (1949); Mahramas v. American Export lsbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d 165, 171 (2d Cir. 1973).
"'SeeCaldarola v. Eckert, 332 U.S. 155 (1947) (state law used to determine whether a general
agent had "control" over a vessel and therefore was responsible for its seaworthiness).
"'Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, supra, 337 U.S. at 795.
"'Id. In McAllister, the act of hiring is considered significant, although as the facts unfold in
the opinion, it becomes apparent that the general agent actually did the hiring on behalf of the
Jones Act employer. See also Mahramas v. American Export lsbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d
165, 171 n.9 (2d Cir. 1973) ("signing ships articles makes a seaman subject to the rules and
discipline of the ship, but this does not make him the ship's employee.
O11337 U.S. at 795.
loId.

'"Id.
"'Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 632 (1959) (duty of care
owed "to all who are on board for purposes not inimical to [the vessel owner's] legitimate
interests").
'"Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 95 (1946) (warranty runs to all "who perform
the ship's service ... with his consent or by his arrangement"); Mahramas v. American Export
Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d 165, 169 (2d Cir. 1973).
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introduce any element of unseaworthiness into the vessel. This in effect
makes the vessel owner liable for injuries caused by the subcontractor,
whether or not the subcontractor was negligent in causing an unseaworthy
condition.' °9 Thus, it would appear that, as long as the injury occurs on the
vessel,' 0 no reduction in liability whatsoever exists for the American vessel
owner which hires a foreign subcontractor, except that if the defendant is not
the Jones Act employer, some significant eccentrities of the Act would be
avoided. For instance, the proximate cause and agency rules for the maritime
theories are the familiar common law standards, while the Jones Act rules are
considerably more liberal.''
The situation is better for the foreign vessel owner hiring an American
independent contractor. If the foreign vessel owner is the employer, the Jones

'°gPetterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 396 (1954). The
Petterson case was a key link in the contorted subversion of the Longshoreman's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1927) [hereinafter
LHCA]. The LHCA had been passed to supplement International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty,
272 U.S. 50 (1926), which held that a longshoreman could sue his employer under the Jones Act
because longshoremen were seamen pro hoc vice. Under the LHCA, a compensation system
unrelated to fault was instituted, but it was not favored by longshoremen because it was less
generous than a suit under the Jones Act. In Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946),
the United States Supreme Court held that vessel owners warranted the seaworthiness of their
vessels to longshoremen and other business invitees. In the Petterson case, the Supreme Court
seemed to be saying that the warranty of seaworthiness was nondelegable and that the vessel
owner was responsible for unseaworthy conditions introduced onto the vessel by the
longshoreman's employer. Finally, in a series of cases that ended with Mitchell v. Trawler Racer,
Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960), the concept of unseaworthiness was expanded to cover the most
transitory conditions posing a danger to seamen. Only pure operating negligence pertaining to
the use of nondefective equipment seems to be exempt from its scope. Usner v. Luckenbach
Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 484 (1971). Meanwhile, the vessel owner was permitted indemnity
from the longshoreman's employer if the latter was at fault. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. PanAtlantic S.S. Co., 350 U.S. 124 (1955). For a discussion of the scope of the unseaworthiness
remedy, see GILMORE & BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, 383-404 (2d ed. 1975).
In 1972, Congress amended the LHCA to bar unseaworthiness actions against vessel owners.
See generally Note, The Injured Longshoreman vs. The Shipowner After 1972: Business In vitees, Land-Based Standards, and Assumption of Risk, 28 HASTINcS L.J. 771 (1977). The LHCA
applies only to harbor workers, however. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3), 903(a). Members of crews are
expressly exempt. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3). As to the latter, Sieracki, Petterson and the like should still
be applicable.
'"The warranty of seaworthiness pertains only to the effects of the vessel, so that injuries away
from the vessel probably cannot be made out to be violations of the warranty. See Gutierrez v.
Waterman S.S. Co., 373 U.S. 206 (1963) (longshoreman injured on dock after slipping on loose
coffee beans unloaded from the vessel). Compare Garrett v. United States Lines, Inc., 574 F.2d
997 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[Tlhe unseaworthiness of a Navy launch ferrying a seaman to shore from
his employer's ship does not render the ship unseaworthy"). A Jones Act action can result from
an injury far from the vessel, as long as the requisite negligence attributable to the employer is
present. Hopson v. Texaco, Inc., 383 U.S. 262 (1966) (taxi accident in Trinidad); O'Donnell v.
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943). In addition, under the Jones Act very
liberal rules pertain to the definition of the employer's agents for whose negligence the employer
is liable. Sinkler v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 356 U.S. 326 (1958). In Hopson, supra, the taxi driver's
negligence was imputed to the vessel owner for the purposes of the Jones Act.
".Under [the Jones Act] the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with
reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing
the injury or death for which damages are sought." Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.,
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Act does not apply unless a substantial contact with the United States justifies
the application of American law. Hiring an American general agent may
constitute "substantial contact" if the American agent "manages" the vessel, since such management may establish an American "base of operations"
under the Rhoditis case.' 2 It would seem to be reasonable, however, that the
mere American citizenship of the managing agent is not enough to establish
an American "base of operations," because an American citizen could perform his managerial functions from a foreign country. In such a circumstance, no substantial contact with the United States should exist.'" In the
case of an agent playing a nonmanagerial role, as with construction subcontractors, no substantial contact with the United States would exist. Vessels
calling upon American ports and using American longshoremen or husbandmen do not subject themselves to United States law.'' 4 It follows, therefore,
that a foreign oil company or other foreign vessel owner would not become
subject to American law if American subcontractors worked on the oil drilling rig on the high seas.
If the foreign vessel owner is not subject to the Jones Act because it is not
the plaintiff's employer, neither can it be sued under the maritime negligence
and unseaworthiness theories, at least as those theories exist in United States
law, because United States maritime law is held to apply to foreigners on the
same basis as the Jones Act. These maritime theories therefore depend upon
the existence of substantial contacts with the United States.'" Thus, absent
the requisite contacts with the United States, the foreign vessel's status as
employer vel non makes no difference to its liability to an injured seaman
under United States law. It may, of course, make a great deal of difference to
its liability under foreign law if the American court decides to retain jurisdiction over the dispute.
Thus, the existence of a managing agent, such as the one in Pavlou, or any
independent contractor, raises interesting issues of Jones Act liability, because one or the other is to be deemed the injured seaman's employer. The
only impact on the choice of law area is whether the presence of an American
agent of a foreign vessel owner constitutes a substantial contact with the
United States, so that a foreign vessel owner is subject to American law.

352 U.S. 521 (1957). See also Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 361 U.S. 107 (1959).
The Jones Act agency rules arc described in note 110 supra.
'"See Pavlou v. Ocean Traders Marine Corp., 211 F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). Also see text
accompanying notes 90-92 supra.
"'See Turner v. Jack Tar Grand Bahama, Ltd., 353 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1965). See text accompanying note 79 supra. See also Rush v. Savchuk, 48 U.S.L.W. 4088 (1980).
'"See text accompanying notes 82-85, supra. Such contracts can be used as evidence that the
base of operations is in the United States, though, even if the contracts by themselves are insufficient. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis, supra, 398 U.S. at 310 (1970); Moncada v. Lemuria
Shipping Co., supra, 491 F.2d at 473.
'"See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 382 (1959); Complaint
of Ta Chi Navigation (Panama) Corp., 462 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).

70

INTERNATIONAL LA WYER

VI. Is Lauritzen a Constitutional Case?
A decision starkly contrary to the whole Bartholomew line of cases is DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc.,"I6 in which American ownership of a foreign subsidiary was the only contact with the United States. All other contacts-flag,
domicile of the plaintiff and immediate owner of the vessel, place the plaintiff signed articles, accessibility of a foreign forum and base of operations of
the vessel-pointed away from application of American law. ' 7 The court
refused to apply the Jones Act, analogizing the plaintiff's argument to an
attempt to impose American law upon the "relations between Texpan and its
employees in its Panamanian gasoline stations because its stock was owned
by a multinational business enterprise incorporated in Delaware.."" Application of the Jones Act, according to the court, was "a variety of 'social
jingoism, which presumes that the "liberal purposes" of American law must
be exported to wherever our multinational corporations are permitted to do
business.' '"'9
The DeMateos court, then, lines up in favor of the balancing test in Lauritzen, equating application of United States law-mandated by the Bartholomew test of substantial contacts-with social jingoism. The case is more
notable, however, for its discussion of the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. According to the DeMateos court, the due process clause
"places bounds upon congressional efforts to apply American rules of deci20
sion to transactions in which the United States has no sufficient interest."'
For this reason, the DeMateos court criticized not only Bartholomew but
also the Supreme Court majority in Rhoditis for propagating a test which
might run afoul of the due process clause:
With deference both to Justice Douglas and Judge Medina, it would seem that the
underlying purpose for identifying and weighing factors is not to effectuate the
liberal purposes of the Jones Act, but to determine whether in the limits of due
process the Act could, and within the limits of the assumed congressional deference
to the conventions of international law that Act should, be applied to the transaction in question.' 2'
The constitutional point raised by the DeMateos court, however, is very
much a bogus issue.
The connection between choice of law and the due process standard was
made by the Supreme Court in Home Insurance Co. v. Dick.'22 There a Texas

''1562 F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978).
'"1d. at 902.
"Id.
119Id.

'°Id. at 900.
"'Id. at 901. The court immediately hereafter seems to dismiss the approval of the Bartholomew test in Rhoditis as dictum.
22281 U.S. 398 (1930).
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resident had an insurance policy with a Mexican corporation which required
a claim of loss to be filed with the corporation within a year of the loss. The
Texas resident had let the year slip by and was not contractually entitled to
recover under the policy. Texas law, however, forbade such terms in insurance claims, and so the Texas resident sued in Texas state court, garnisheeing
debts owed to the Mexican defendant. The Texas courts found that the Texas
statute should apply, but the Supreme Court declared this a violation of due
process, holding that because the transactions had no contacts with Texas
(except the citizenship of the plaintiff), Texas law could not apply.
The decision, it is true, holds that federal constitutional grounds exist for
reversing "state court decisions for what [appear] to be conspicuously inappropriate choices of law."' 23 But this standard would appear to be satisfied
by the slightest of governmental interest in the dispute before it. ,24 By its very
formulation, the "substantial contacts" doctrine of Bartholomew exceeds
the minimal requirements of due process so that no constitutional issue could
possibly exist where the Bartholomew standard has been met.
It should be noted that while the DeMateos court was of the opinion that
the Bartholomew test was potentially violative of the due process considerations, the facts in DeMateos were such that due process standards clearly
were met. The owner of the vessel in DeMateos was a corporation wholly
owned by Texaco, Inc.,' an American citizen whose activities abroad are
clearly within the federal legislative ambit.' 26
The constitutional issue in DeMateos, therefore, should be ignored. It
presents a truism which can never arise if substantial contacts are actually
present. Instead, the DeMateos case should be read merely as reasserting the
supremacy of the Lauritzen balancing test over the substantial contacts test.
Under the DeMateos line of cases, then, it can be expected that one hundred
percent American ownership of the ultimate corporate entity will not by itself
establish the applicability of the Jones Act.' 7

...GOODRICH

& SCALES, CONFLICTS OF LAWS 22 (1964).
"'Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964); Watson v. Employers Liability
Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
" DeMateos v. Texaco Panama, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 411, 415 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 562 F.2d
895 (3d Cir. 1977), cerl. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978).
"'Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421,438 (1932)
("The jurisdiction of the United States over its absent citizen, so far as the binding effect of its
legislation is concerned, is a jurisdiction in personam, as he is personally bound to take notice of
the laws that are applicable to him and to obey him."); Alvarez v. Creole Petroleum Corp., 462
F. Supp. 782, 785 (D. Del. 1978) (ultimate one hundred percent ownership by Creole, an Exxon
subsidiary) ("Given the fact that Creole is a Delaware corporation, I do not doubt that Congress
has the power to impose liability on it in circumstances of this kind without offending the Due
Process Clause.").
"'See Alvarez v. Creole Petroleum Corp., supra, 462 F. Supp. at 785.
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Conclusion
A review of the case law makes it apparent that "the substantial contacts"
theory in Bartholomew is generally accepted as the operative choice of law
principle in Jones Act cases, except in the Third Circuit, where the balancing
test set forth in Lauritzen v. Larsen is the operative test. Under the Bartholomew test the principal means for a foreign seaman to proceed under the Jones
Act in a United States court is to show that the defendant shipping company
is ultimately American in character. This can be done by showing American
ownership or control from an American location. In spite of some indications from the United States Supreme Court that the law of the flag might be
resurrected as the controlling factor, courts outside the Third Circuit seem
more than willing to ignore the law of the flag if the facts show that the
defendant benefits from the protection of American law.

